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The massive recall of defective medical heart devices2
raises the question of how effectively the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) regulates the industry that manufactures heart
devices implanted in the chests of tens of thousands of people.3 The
issue has become political as Congress passes tort reform legislation
designed to limit people's ability to go to court seeking redress.
Missing in the debate are the people whose lives depend on medical
4heart devices. Their voices and experiences continually have gone
unheard.
A primary example of how the FDA fails patients is in the case
of Guidant Corporation ("Guidant"), one of the nation's three largest
heart device manufacturers. 5 Executives reportedly knew for those
* Business reporter for The Salt Lake Tribune. She was formerly a law
reporter as well as the professional in residence for the Communication
Department at Utah State University.
1. I stepped into a different world when I had the privilege of monitoring a
panel at Loyola Law School's symposium, Access to Justice: The Economics
of Civil Justice. I am a reporter for The Salt Lake Tribune and, more to the
point, I do not think or write like an academic. I believe in the power of the
narrative, of stories about people whose lives are changed or harmed by
dominant forces, particularly business or government interests, which are much
greater than themselves.
2. See infra notes, 3, 28, 31 and 160.
3. See Lauran Neergaard, FDA: Defibrillator Defects on the Rise,
DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 17, 2005, http://www.detnews.com/2005/health/0509/
18/healt-317834.htm. These malfunctioning devices include pacemakers,
which regulate irregular heartbeats, and defibrillators, which send an electrical
charge to the heart to interrupt a potentially fatal rhythm. Id.
4. See infra Part I.
5. Barry Meier, F.D.A. Had Report of Short Circuit in Heart Devices,
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three years about flaws in one of its widely used defibrillators' but
the company did not tell physicians about the problems until May
2005. 7  Months earlier, Guidant informed the FDA that the
company's product, Ventak Prizm 2 DR, was short circuiting
approximately once a month.8 The FDA, however, did not notify the
public of this problem until June 2005. 9 The public notification
came several months after a college student, who had one of the
defibrillators implanted in his chest, died when the device reportedly
failed.' °
Against this backdrop, the Republican-controlled Congress has
passed legislation limiting people's access to the courts and is
considering more tort-reform bills. 11  The FDA meanwhile
announced that it would renew efforts to more closely regulate the
medical heart device industry, 12 and companies have announced that
they will rekindle their goal of protecting customers. 13  These
announcements apparently have satisfied Congress, which has no
pending bills affecting either medical heart devices or their
manufacturers. 
14
The nonpartisan Center for Responsive Politics, which tracks
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, at Al.
6. Id.
7. Id.; see also Press Release, Guidant, Guidant Notifies Physicians
Regarding VENTAK 1861 PRIZM 2 DR Implantable Defibrillator (May 25,
2005), http://www.guidant.com/news/500/webrelease/nr_000546.shtml.
8. Meier, supra note 5, at Al.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119
Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
12. See Press Release, FDA, FDA Announces New Program to Transform
and Strengthen Medical Device Safety (Jan. 20, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/
bbs/topics/news/2006/NEW01300.html.
13. See, e.g., Press Release, Guidant, Guidant Response to Media Story on
Product Performance (Oct. 20, 2005), http://www.guidant.com/news/500/
webrelease/nr_000585.shtml; Press Release, Guidant, Guidant Publishes
Responses to U.S. Food and Drug Administration Form 483 Observations
(Oct. 27, 2005), http://www.guidant.com/news/500/webrelease/nr_000587
.shtml.
14. See generally Library of Congress, Bills, Resolutions-Thomas,
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/bills_res.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2006) (allowing
the public to search for pending congressional bills; no bills of this type
pending as of date of publication).
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money in politics,' 5 reports that Republicans and their business
supporters have consistently tried to change "the rules on class-
action lawsuits, only to be thwarted in their efforts by consumer
groups and trial lawyers." 16 After the 2004 elections, however, the
Republican-controlled Senate began debating the Class Action
Fairness Act (CAFA), 17 which grants federal jurisdiction to class
action lawsuits, a forum considered more favorable to corporate
clients. 
18
The Senate passed the bill in February 2005 by a vote of 72 to
26,19 rejecting Democratic amendments that would have made it
more difficult for federal courts to dismiss class action claims. 20 The
House passed the measure by a vote of 279 to 149 the following
21week. President George W. Bush signed the bill into law on
22February 18, 2005. It was a huge victory for business associations,
which sent eighty-four percent of their individual and Political
Action Committee (PAC) contributions to Republicans 23 and spent
tens of millions of dollars on lobbying in the 2004 elections." It also
was a big win for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which was the
leading business group lobbying in favor of class action and tort
reform, and raises millions in corporate contributions for its
25legislative efforts. In 2003, more than $16 million of those
contributions went toward lobbying the federal government.
26
CAFA, passed by Congress and signed into law within eight
15. Center for Responsive Politics, About the Center for Responsive
Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/about/index.asp (last visited Jan. 31,
2006).
16. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Courts: Class Action Reform,
http://www.opensecrets.org/payback/issue.asp?issueid=CA I &CongNo= 109
(last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
17. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). See Center for Responsive
Politics, supra note 16.
18. See GEORGENE M. VAIRO, THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005:
A REvIEw AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS (2005).
19. 151 CONG. REc. S 1225, S 1249 (2005).
20. Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 16.
21. 151 CONG. REC. H723, H755 (2005).
22. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 4.
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days, marked a major defeat for the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America (ATLA) because the Act limits a plaintiffs opportunity to
bring a case to court.
27
Consumers have filed dozens of class-action lawsuits against
28Guidant since the company's recall of 109,000 defibrillators. On
November 7, 2005, a federal multidistrict litigation panel
29consolidated cases before one federal judge in Minnesota, where
one of Guidant's Cardiac Rhythm Management Division is located.30
Guidant is not the only company that has recalled medical
devices. In February 2005, the largest heart device manufacturer,
Medtronic Inc., advised physicians about potential battery failures in
87,000 of some of its implantable-model defibrillators.3 Within a
mere four months, St. Jude Medical Inc. announced that 30,000 of its
defibrillators needed software upgrades to prevent potential
problems.
32
The issue surrounding defective heart devices is particularly
urgent because the number of people with implantable cardioverter
defibrillators (ICD) is increasing.33 The federally funded Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services paid for 52,500 defibrillator
implantations in 2003 and for 65,000 the next year. 34  These
federally funded programs are also paying for replacement surgeries
and, because manufacturers' warranties only cover their own models,
these additional costs are falling on taxpayers' shoulders.
Heart devices, which are widely used to treat cardiovascular
disease, have become a life-or-death issue for many Americans.
Cardiovascular disease is the number one killer in the United States,
27. Id.
28. Avram Goldstein, Guidant Lawsuit Settlement May Be First Tied to
Defibrillators, BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 22, 2005, http://quote.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=aLvCq8w8Si9I&refer=newsindex.
29. Id.
30. Guidant, About Us, Locations, http://www.guidant.com/about/locations
.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
31. Robert Steinbrook, The Controversy over Guidant's Implantable
Defibrillators, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 221, 223 (2005).
32. Id.
33. E-mail from Zina Lewis to Dawn House, Reporter, The Salt Lake
Tribune (Feb. 21, 2006, 15:37:00 MST) (on file with author) (stating that "[i]n
2004, an estimated 135,000 devices were implanted in patients in the United
States alone, a near tripling of the number in 2000").
34. Steinbrook, supra note 31, at 222.
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claiming more lives than the next four leading causes of death
combined.35 To put it another way, the number of Americans under
the age of sixty-five who die from heart disease each year is over
150,000 36-which, coincidentally, is about half the number of
pacemakers and defibrillators taken off the market this year alone.
37
This combination of increased heart disease and faulty treatment
therein is, put simply, lethal.
11. MEDICAL EXPERTISE DOES NOT MITIGATE DANGERS
Despite this problem of epidemic proportions, the congressional
debate over tort reform largely lacked input from those very people
who might die from heart device failure. Zina Lewis, age thirty-
eight, of Salt Lake City, is one of the few people actually telling her
story and trying to bring about change.
38
Lewis grew up in the University of Utah hospital after
contracting a severe case of viral pneumonia when she was fourteen-
years-old.39 By the time she was nineteen, after years of worsening
heart problems, she underwent a medical procedure that created a
complete atrioventricular block, making her one hundred percent
dependent on a pacemaker.
n°
Although she had to complete some of her university course
work from a hospital bed, she was grateful to be essentially symptom
35. AM. HEART ASS'N, HEART DISEASE AND STROKE STATISTIcs-2005
UPDATE 3 (2005), http://www.americanheart.org/downloadable/heart/
1136308648540Statupdate2006.pdf (naming the next four leading causes of
death as "cancer, chronic lower respiratory diseases, accidents, and diabetes
mellitus").
36. Id.
37. Neergaard, supra note 3 (stating that of the numerous pacemakers and
defibrillators doctors implanted from 1990 to 2002, more than 17,000 of them
had to be surgically removed because of malfunctions).
38. ZINA LEwis, STATEMENT TO THE HEART RHYTHM SOCIETY AND THE
HEART RHYTHM FOUNDATION IN COOPERATION WITH THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION (FDA): RE: PROTECTING LIFE, PRESERVING TRUST AND
PROMOTING HEALTH: A PATIENT'S VOICE FOR SAFETY 2 (2005), available at
http://www.edfirmage.netlHRSStatementl.pdf (abstract prepared for the
Policy Conference on Pacemaker and ICD Performance).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2, 6; DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 228 (30th
ed. 2003) (defining an atrioventricular block as an "impairment of conduction
of cardiac impulses from the atria to the ventricles").
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free.4' She held this belief until December 1992 when she learned
that the lead wire for her pacemaker had been taken off the market
nearly a year and a half before.42 It was against the law for
manufacturers to directly notify patients when heart devices are
found to be defective.43 Instead, companies contacted physicians
who, in turn, informed patients "regardless of whether or not the
patient was currently under their care." 44  Lewis' home address,
tucked away in her physician's file cabinet in Utah, had been
incorrectly recorded.45 Lewis finally learned about the defective
Medtronic lead wire during a routine checkup at the Coronary Care
Unit at University of Utah Hospital.46
Although the FDA was aware of certain medical device recalls,
they failed to relay that information to Lewis. 47 This failure could be
attributed to the FDA's reliance on heart-device manufacturers for
most if its data in deciding when to recall devices.48
Her story is all the more troubling because Lewis is an advanced
practice nurse and the Manager of Clinical Research and
Development at an institution that participated in clinical trials
sponsored by industry companies, including Guidant.49 Despite her
medical background, Lewis did not know for nearly one and a half
years about the recall on her pacemaker's lead wires,50 which are
wires that carry electrical impulses from the pacemaker to the
heart.5' Her trust in both the FDA and device manufacturers has
consequently declined.52
41. See Dawn House, Utah Woman Wants Answers About her Pacemaker,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 6, 2005, at E7.





47. See id. at 15.
48. See id. at 24; see, e.g., Meier, supra note 5 (stating that the FDA learned
of the Prizm 2 DR defect through Guidant's annual report submitted to the
organization).
49. LEWIS, supra note 38, at 2.
50. Id. at 6.
51. See Yale Medical Group, Cardiovascular Diseases: Overview of
Pacemakers/Defibrillators, http://ymghealthinfo.org/content.asp?pageid=
P00234 (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
52. See LEWIS, supra note 39, at 2 ("Though I have sustained life altering,
and in all likelihood, life-shortening... injury due to device therapy over the
824 [Vol. 39:2
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Lewis already has endured three operations to replace faulty
lead wires; 53 one operation injured her heart even more, leaving a
damaged and torn tricuspid valve and a hole between an artery and
vein.5 4 In 2002, her pacemaker was replaced with Guidant Pulsar
Max 11,55 and a year later, that device was recalled as well.56 Even
before that recall, Lewis experienced rapid deterioration related to
pacing and tachycardia issues, which eventually led to Lewis' heart
failure.57  She underwent numerous treatments and open-heart
surgery to replace the pacemaker, both lead wires, and a heart
valve.58
In September 2005, her Guidant pacemaker, Insignia, also was
recalled. 59  Given her dependence on her pacemaker and her
underlying heart disorder, another surgery was scheduled in
November, 2005, a month after the recall.6 °
Lewis considered this failure to inform "a decision which
jeopardized [her] life.,, 6 1 And she understands the consequences of
delayed notification because of her expertise in the medical field.62
Yet even with their medical backgrounds, 63 Lewis and her
husband have been unable to advocate change in the federal
reporting system, such as requiring physicians, the FDA and
manufacturers to notify patients when devices are recalled.64 This
change in policy makes sense because both the FDA and the
companies maintain registries with patients' names.65 Cardiologist
years, I have trusted the device manufacturers and the FDA as 'partners for
life,' until now.").
53. See id. at2,8, 10.
54. Id. at 6-8.
55. Id. at 11.
56. Id. at 15.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 6-16; see also House, supra note 41, at E7.
59. Press Release, Guidant, Guidant Initiates Voluntary Physician Advisory
on Certain Pacemakers (Sept. 22, 2005), http://www.guidant.com/news/
500/webrelease/nr_000576.shtml.
60. See House, supra note 41.
61. LEWIS, supra note 38, at 6.
62. See id. at 2. Lewis had an eighteen-year career in cardiovascular
medicine at the University of Utah Medical Center and a large biotechnology
firm. Id.
63. E-mail from Zina Lewis to Dawn House, supra note 34.
64. Id.
65. See LEWIS, supra note 38, at 29.
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Roger Freedman, a heart-device specialist at the University of Utah
and consultant for Guidant, Medtronic and St. Jude, agrees that the
reporting system needs a back-up. 6 6 Freedman explained that "[i]t
would be a huge administrative burden so some type of financial
support would be necessary, but we must be able to get unbiased, up-
to-date information on the reliability of these devices."
67
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer filed a civil lawsuit in
November, 2005 against Guidant in the New York State Supreme
Court, claiming Guidant hid information on defects with its
defibrillators (specifically the Prizm 2 DR Model 1861) that could
cause the device to fail with potentially fatal consequences. 68 Spitzer
called Guidant's behavior fraudulent 69 and further stated that "[w]e
wouldn't permit this type of conduct in connection with the sale of
cars or washing machines. It is simply unconscionable that it
occurred with a critical medical device.",
70
The lawsuit makes a claim under section 63(12) of the state's
Executive Law,71 which empowers the Attorney General's Office to
sue individuals or entities that engage in repeated or persistent
fraudulent or illegal business practices.72 By definition, the term
fraud, in its general sense, includes concealment.73 The complaint
alleges that Guidant concealed material information to doctors about
the performance of this device.
74
66. See Dawn House, Are Guidant Devices a Help or a Hazard, SALT LAKE
TRI., Nov. 6, 2005, at El.
67. Id.
68. Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney Gen. Eliot Spitzer,
Medical Device Maker Sued for Hiding Defibrillator Defect (Nov. 3, 2003),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/nov/nov03a_05.html (explaining that
the lawsuit alleged that Guidant sold defibrillators with a known design flaw
without notifying doctors of the defect, possibly resulting in at least 28 failures
of the product and one patient's death).
69. Id. ("Concealment of negative facts that might influence a consumer to
purchase another manufacturer's product is the essence of fraud[.]").
70. Id.
71. N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 2002).
72. Complaint at 9, Spitzer v. Guidant, No. 403656/05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed
Nov. 2, 2005).
73. 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud andDeceit § 1(2001).
74. Complaint, supra note 72, at 2.
[Vol. 39:2
WHAT ABO UT THE LITTLE G UY?
III. PHYSICIANS TURN TO MEDIA
-NOT THE FDA-TO ALERT THE PUBLIC
The story about faulty medical heart devices was first made
public after twenty-one-year-old college student Joshua Oukrop, died
of a heart attack while bicycling in Moab, Utah.75 A Guidant official
informed Oukrop's cardiologist, Dr. Barry Maron, that the patient's
defibrillator had short-circuited and become permanently disabled.76
Dr. Maron then contacted a senior consulting cardiologist at the
Minneapolis Heart Institute Foundation, Dr. Robert Hauser.77 Dr
Hauser searched Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience
(MAUDE), and found "other reports from Guidant of instances in
which the Prizm 2 DR Model 1861 had short-circuited in exactly the
same way as Oukrop's had done."79 Two months after Oukrop's
death, Guidant officials met with Dr. Maron at the Minneapolis Heart
Institute.80 When Dr. Maron asked how the defect information
would be relayed to other physicians and patients, a representative
answered that they did not believe they needed to relay the
information, nor did they think it was advisable.
81
Maron picked up the telephone and called the New York Times.
82
Dr. Maron never thought to call the FDA because "[ilt is not an
agency that has an effective system for this type of issue or the
resources to deal with such a problem rapidly."
83
After the story broke, Public Citizen, a consumer organization
with 135,000 members, petitioned the FDA to establish tighter
regulations governing how the FDA evaluates medical devices.
84
75. See Steinbrook, supra note 31, at 221.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. See FDA, Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience Database
(MAUDE), http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/maude.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2006).
79. Steinbrook, supra note 31, at 221, 223 ("As of June 17, 2005, Guidant
and the FDA were aware of 43 reports of device failures, including 28
involving Prizm 2 DR devices.").
80. Id. at 221-22.
81. Id. at222.
82. House, supra note 66.
83. Id.
84. Letter from Rachel Roisman, MD, Research Assoc. & Peter Lurie, MD,
MPH, Deputy Dir., Pub. Citizen, to Daniel Schultz, MD, Dir., Ctr. For Devices
and Radiological Health, FDA (Sept. 14, 2005), available at http://www.
citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7401 &seclD=l 163 &catLD= 126.
August 2006]
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The system currently allows companies to delay removal of a flawed
device while physicians continue to use the remaining inventory.
85
This practice benefits the manufacturer, which can deplete its
inventory of older, defective devices, but endangers patients who
receive these inferior products. 86 In the petition, the group pointed to
an example to demonstrate this practice. 87 One heart-device patient
88had to have a failed St. Jude pacemaker replaced. At the time the
patient received the second St. Jude device, he was not aware that
"St. Jude and the FDA had known that the [second] Xpacemaker...
was inferior to another St. Jude device" on the market.
Guidant defended the manufacturer's performance in a letter to
patients:
We at Guidant Cardiac Rhythm Management recognize that
our recent voluntary physician communications involving
several of our pacemaker and defibrillator products may
have created concern for you or your family.
All of us at Guidant are deeply aware of the enormous
responsibilities that come along with providing products
that hold the promise of powerful and positive impact on
people's lives....
Presently, we are working with physicians, with outside
experts, and with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
to make even better information available to you and your
doctor about product reliability performance.
Importantly, tens of thousands of people are alive and
hundreds of thousands of people feel better because of
pacemakers and defibrillators. As Guidant, we will
continue to work hard to earn your trust.90
The FDA released a study in September 2005, which indicated
that the number of defective defibrillators increased between the
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id. (discussing the case history of one patient, Mark Gleeson).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Letter from Fred McCoy, President, Cardiac Rhythm Mgmt., Guidant,
to Patients and Families (Aug. 12, 2005), available at http://www.guidant.com/
patient/communication/mccoy.pdf (emphasis added).
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years 1990 and 2002.91  The study revealed that the defective
defibrillators led to thirty-one deaths.92 By contrast, the rate of
replacing malfunctioning pacemakers steadily declined.93
These figures are likely to be low estimates because the study
tracked only surgically removed devices, and doctors are not
required to report malfunctions if the patient died from underlying
heart disease, which is sometimes a difficult distinction.94  In
discussing this study, the FDA responded:
All sophisticated medical devices like these have certain
risks. Our challenge remains to uncover these risks,
measure them, and make information available to patients
and doctors to help guide their personalized decisions about
where the benefits of technologies like these outweigh
known or potential risks from their use.
95
Gaps in the nation's reporting system are not a new
phenomenon. 96 A 1986 report by the General Accounting Office
(GAO), the accounting arm of Congress, demonstrated that doctors
reported to the FDA less than one percent of the device problems
occurring in hospitals. 97 The report showed that the more serious the
problem, the less likely doctors were to report it.98 In a follow-up
study three years later, the GAO concluded that reporting problems
still existed and that the FDA could have better systems in place to
enforce medical device reporting regulation." A similar study
91. Press Release, FDA, FDA Releases Results of Study on Defibrillator
and Pacemaker Malfunctions Part of Agency Drive to Improve Device Safety
Monitoring and Public Communications (Sept. 16, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/
bbs/topics/NEWS/2005/NEW01231.html; see also Neergaard, supra note 3
(reporting details of the FDA study).
92. Neergaard, supra note 3.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. FDA, supra note 91.
96. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
97. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-87-1, MEDICAL
DEVICES: EARLY WARNING OF PROBLEMS IS HAMPERED BY SEVERE
UNDERREPORTING 41 (1986), available at http://archive.goa.gov/f0102/
132008.pdf.
98. Id. at 45.
99. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-89-1, MEDICAL
DEVICES: FDA'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEDICAL DEVICE REPORTING
REGULATION 63-66 (1989), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbatl5/
138212.pdf; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOuNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-97-21,
August 20061 829
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released eight years later found that the FDA's reporting system was
so slow that the agency was not providing early warnings to the
public on device malfunctions.100 Patients can log onto the FDA's
Web site to search the agency's online database MAUDE for
information about medical devices.' 0' Manufacturers themselves,
however, provide most of the data, °2 and thus it seems the FDA"entrusts the heart device industry to police itself."' 10 3
IV. LAWSUIT ABUSE AWARENESS WEEK
Two days after Loyola Law School's symposium, Access to
Justice: The Economics of Civil Justice, Representative Tom Price of
Georgia acknowledged Lawsuit Abuse Awareness Week in front of
the U.S. House of Representatives. 104 This recognition reflects the
federal government's bias in considering more legislation to curb
people's ability to go to court in a variety of areas. 1°5 The Alliance
for Justice, the Center for Justice & Democracy, the Consumer
Federation of America, and ten other organizations wrote a letter to
the House, stating, "'Lawsuit Abuse Awareness Week' is another in
a long line of efforts to shield powerful special interests from
accountability for their misconduct."' 10 6 The letter continued: "We
urge [Congress] to oppose these bills, and any legislation that
protects corporations from taking responsibility for the harms they
cause."
, 107
The appeal was fruitless. In October, 2005, the House passed
MEDICAL DEVICE REPORTING: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA'S SYSTEM
FOR MONITORING PROBLEMS WITH APPROVED DEVICES 6 (1997), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97021.pdf [hereinafter GAO, MEDICAL
DEVICE REPORTING] ("[T]he problem still existed despite full-scale
implementation of the medical device reporting regulation.").
100. GAO, MEDICAL DEVICE REPORTING, supra note 99, at 2.
101. See FDA, supra note 78.
102. See id.; see generally GAO, MEDICAL DEVICE REPORTING, supra note
99 (describing the FDA's creation of and expectations of the reporting system).
103. House, supra note 66; see GAO, MEDICAL DEVICE REPORTING, supra
note 99.
104. See 151 CONG. REC. H8252 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2005) (statement of
Rep. Price).
105. See Letter from Alliance for Justice et al. to House Representatives
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the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act,'0 8 "which prohibits
liability actions against firearms or ammunition manufacturers and
sellers for unlawful misuse of their products."'0 9 President Bush
signed the measure into law on October 26, 2005.110 The House also
passed the Personal Responsibility of Food Consumption Act,"'
dubbed the "cheeseburger bill," which bans lawsuits against food
processors and restaurants concerning food-related health problems
and obesity. 1 2 The House additionally passed the Lawsuit Abuse
Reduction Act," 13 which would "roll back Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to an earlier 1983 version of the rule.""
4
These latter two measures must now go before the Senate.
More to the point for patients with defective medical heart
devices, the Republican-controlled House passed the Help Efficient,
Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2005 in
July 2005,1 15 which preempts state law on some aspects of medical
malpractice liability.' 16 The measure places a $250,000 cap on non-
economic damages in states that have no limits,' 17 eliminates joint
108. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. A. § 7901
(2005).
109. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, Statement
on S. 397, the "Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act" (Oct. 26, 2005),
http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/print/20051026-1.html.
110. Id.
111. Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 554,
109th Cong. (lst Sess. 2005).
112. House Passes 'Cheeseburger Bill', CBS NEws, Mar. 10, 2004,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/10/health/main605157.shtml.
113. Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, H.R. 420, 109th Cong.
114. Letter from Alliance for Justice et al. to House Representatives, supra
note 105; see also Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act Opposed by ABA, Your
A.B.A. (A.B.A., Chicago, 111.), Oct. 2005, http://www.abanet.org/media/
youraba/200510/article09.html (listing various consequences of the Act,
including how "it would impose mandatory sanctions for any violation of Rule
11, removing current safe harbor provisions").
115. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH)
Act of 2005, H.R. 5, 109th Cong.
116. See id. § 11(b); HENRY COHEN, LIBRARY OF CONG., MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY REFORM: H.R. 534, 109TH CONGRESS 1-2 (2005),
available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/
RS2205403072005.pdf (explaining that state law governs medical malpractice
suits but Congress can legislate on medical malpractice suits under the
Commerce Clause if the suits affect interstate commerce).
117. H.R. 5 § 4(b); see also COHEN, supra note 116, at 2 (addressing the
effects of H.R. 534, which proposes substantively identical measures as H.R.
August 20061
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and several liability, 1 8 and modifies the collateral source rule.1 9 In
medical malpractice cases, the measure further limits lawyers'
contingent fees based on a sliding scale.'
20
The measure, endorsed by Bush, now goes before the
Senate.122 The night the House passed the liability reform measure,
President Bush issued a press release stating:
The Nation's medical liability system is badly broken, as
frivolous lawsuits are threatening access to quality health
care and raising health care costs for all Americans. The
medical liability crisis is driving up health care costs
through higher insurance premiums, higher medical bills,
and the practice of defensive medicine.... This is a
national problem that deserves a national solution.
2 3
These are strong words from someone who had been ambivalent
about tort reform until John Edwards, former Democratic Senator
from North Carolina and trial lawyer, announced in 2003 that he
would run for president. 1
24
5).
118. H.R. 5 § 4(d); see also COHEN, supra note 116, at 3-4 (addressing the
effects of H.R. 534, which proposes substantively identical measures as H.R.
5).
119. H.R. 5 § 6; see also COHEN, supra note 116, at 4 (addressing the effects
of H.R. 534, which proposes substantively identical measures as H.R. 5).
120. H.R. 5 § 5(a) (stating that 40% of the first $50,000 the plaintiff
recovered, 33.3% of the next $50,000, 25% of the next $500,000 and 15% of
any amounts exceeding $600,000); see also COHEN, supra note 116, at 4--5
(addressing the effects of H.R. 534, which proposes identical measures as H.R.
5).
121. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Pleased by
House Passage of Medical Liability Reform (July 28, 2005),
http:llwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050728-7.html (stating
that President Bush was pleased that the House of Representatives continues to
pass meaningful medical liability reform legislation and hopes that the Senate
will do so in the future).
122. GovTrack, H.R. 5: Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely
Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2005, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?
bill=h109-5 (last visited Dec. 28, 2005).
123. Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 121.
124. Center for Responsive Politics, Health: Medical Malpractice Reform,
http://www.opensecrets.org/payback/issue.asp?issueid=MM2&congno= 108
(hereinafter Health: Medical Malpractice Reform) (last visited Feb. 18, 2006).
But see Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 16 (stating that Republicans
and their business allies have spent years trying to revise class-action reform
lawsuits).
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The House passed a similar medical malpractice measure during
the 108th Congress that placed caps on non-economic and punitive
damages awards 25 and reduced the statute of limitations. The
Senate struck down a similar bill after Senate Democrats threatened a
filibuster. 27 Republican Senator John Ensign from Nevada who
sponsored the bill in the Senate received more than $300,000 in
individual and PAC donations from health professionals, including
doctors, who were Ensign's top contributors during the 1997-2002
Senate election cycle.'
28
The American Medical Association (AMA), one of the nation's
top political donors and represents doctors nationwide, designated
liability reform as its number one issue during the 1 0 8th session of
Congress. 129 The AMA contributed $2.7 million during the 2002
election cycle, earmarking sixty percent of those funds for
Republicans. 30  Conversely, the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America, which runs one of the largest PACs in the country,
contributed $3.7 million in individual, PAC, and soft money
donations during the 2002 election cycle, giving nearly ninety
percent of those contributions to Democrats.
1 3 1
Although medical device manufacturers face the same types of
product liability claims as any other company, the medical
malpractice reform movement may be broad enough to encompass
products used in the medical field.132 Yet reports stretching back to
the 1970s show there are few medical malpractice lawsuits despite an
epidemic of medical malpractice.' 33 "There are [generally] between
seven and twenty-five serious medical malpractice injuries for every
one medical malpractice lawsuit."'134 Tort reform legislation enacted
125. H.R. 5 §§ 4(b)-(c), 7(b)(2).
126. Id. § 3 (requiring healthcare lawsuits to commence three years after the
date injury manifests or one year after discovery or possible reasonable
discovery); see also Health: Medical Malpractice Reform, supra note 124
(stating that the House bill restricted damages for pain and suffering at
$250,000 and limited the amount of time for a plaintiff to file a lawsuit).





132. ToM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 11 (2005).
133. Id. at2.
134. Id. at 23.
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since 2000 in many states nonetheless suggests that legislators and
voters believe medical malpractice lawsuits threatened health care
more than medical malpractice. 1
35
Indeed, a poll leading up to Lawsuit Abuse Awareness week
released by SickofLawsuits.org showed "seventy-nine percent of
Americans believe advertising by personal injury lawyers encourages
people to sue even if they have not been injured." 136 A spokesperson
for the Sick of Lawsuits campaign explained:
Generally speaking, frivolous lawsuits and outrageous jury
awards threaten our access to affordable health care, reduce
medical innovation and take life-saving medicines off the
shelves. Patients who have been harmed deserve fair
compensation that has not been diluted or delayed by some
greedy personal injury lawyers and uninjured patients
looking to cash in.' 37
Back in Salt Lake City, Zina Lewis is diligently working away,
trying to gather what she says is life-saving information from
Guidant and the FDA. 138 She needs this information to help her
make decisions regarding more surgeries on her pacemaker and its
lead wires on which she is totally dependent to keep her heart
beating. 139 Besides writing repeatedly to Guidant and the FDA, she
also appealed to more than twenty members of Congress, including
her Republican senator from Utah, Orrin Hatch, and Health and
Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt, a former Utah governor and
family acquaintance. 140  Senator Hatch replied to Lewis's letter,
"expressing his concerns and touting the Medical Device User Fee
135. Id.
136. Press Release, Sick of Lawsuits, SickofLawsuits.org's National
Education Campaign Reveals Americans' Concerns about Personal Injury
Lawsuit Advertising (Sept. 19, 2005), http://www.sickoflawsuits.org/content/
news/media_20050919.cfm (stating that a national survey of 800 likely voters
was conducted by Public Opinion Strategies on behalf of Citizens Against
Lawsuit Abuse-a nonpartisan, grassroots campaign representing more than
165,000 supporters, including doctors, healthcare providers, small business
owners and attorneys).
137. E-mail from Evelyn Tobias-Merrill, Spokesperson, Sick of Lawsuits, to
Dawn House, Reporter, The Salt Lake Tribune (Nov. 30, 2005, 08:30:00 a.m.
MST) (on file with author).
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and Modernization Act that allows inspections of certain device
manufacturers." 141 Company participation in this program is,
however, voluntary. 1
42
Earlier in September 2005, Lewis traveled to Washington D.C.
to speak at the national conference hosted by the Heart Rhythm
Society and the Heart Rhythm Foundation in cooperation with the
FDA. 14 3 She was the only speaker not connected to a heart-device
manufacturer, government organization, or media source to speak at
the conference. 44 During the question and answer portion of the
conference, the moderator cut Lewis off before she could ask two
questions of federal regulatory officials and manufacturers:145 How
much information is withheld from the public because it is
considered a corporate trade secret? 146 And, without full disclosure,
how can physicians practice evidence-based medicine?
147
Shortly before Lewis' surgery in November 2005 to replace her
defective Insignia model, Lewis unsuccessfully attempted to obtain
more information from Guidant on whether the lead wires that
connect the device to her heart should be replaced. 148 Explaining the
importance of obtaining the information about her heart devices,
Lewis said:
Despite the rash of recalls and safety concerns, many of us
have been deliberately denied access to safety data on
devices, which we currently have implanted. This industry
begs for litigation by its betrayal of patient safety and
disclosure and indifference to human suffering, not because
of fallibility of products or human error.... The obligation
is unique to this industry among all others, because every
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. LEWIS, supra note 38, at 2.
144. Id. at 1 (Speaking at the conference were: Mike Leavitt, Secretary of
Health and Human Services; Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman, Committee
on Finance; Dr. Robert J. Myerburg, Chair, Guidant Independent Panel; Barry
Meier, The New York Times; and Zina Lewis, MS, SPRN-C, CRRN, Director,
Steward Development).
145. E-mail from Zina Lewis to Dawn House, supra note 34.
146. See LEWIS, supra note 38, at 4 (listing this question in Lewis' abstract
as part of Lewis' prepared speech for the conference).
147. See id. (listing this question in Lewis' abstract as part of Lewis'
prepared speech for the conference).
148. House, supra note 41.
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action (or inaction) can affect a patient's life-and a family
who grieves when one is permanently disabled or dies. The
implications are potentially catastrophic. This recent
corporate behavior has made many of us feel like "ticking
time bombs.'
49
About the same time as Lewis' surgery, the manufacturer was
under scrutiny by federal investigators, and a $25 billion deal to be
acquired by Johnson & Johnson appeared shaky.150  Guidant
disclosed that "failure of lead wires is substantially more common
than that of the device itself."'15 1 The manufacturer "cited 109 cases
involving one lead-wire model, and 70 cases involving another."'
152
By contrast, the majority "of Guidant defibrillators have experienced
fewer than five device failures during their lifetimes."' 153 A
cardiologist at Virginia Commonwealth University said that
"[d]efibrillators 'are 99%-plus reliable... But leads are less reliable,
and in five to 10 years maybe 3 % to 5 % of leads will have to be
replaced."'
154
In November 2005, Guidant and Johnson & Johnson entered
into a revised agreement in which Johnson & Johnson acquired the
manufacturer for $21.5 billion. 155 The companies, which originally
entered into an acquisition agreement in December 2004, expect to
close the deal in the first quarter of 2006.156 When questioned about
the agreement, the chairman of Guidant said, "Our enthusiasm for
this agreement and its potential continues. This agreement makes
sense for Guidant shareholders and employees. It amplifies the
opportunity for us to do more for patients with cardiovascular disease
through a union with Johnson & Johnson."'
157
In December 2005, however, Boston Scientific Corporation
149. LEWIS, supra note 38, at 3-4.
150. Thomas M. Burton, Guidant Finds Wires Are Cause of Most





155. Press Release, Johnson & Johnson, Johnson & Johnson and Guidant
Corporation Announce Revised Acquisition Agreement with Net Value of $19
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made an unexpected $25 billion takeover offer for Guidant, bidding
more than $3 billion more than what Johnson & Johnson had agreed
to pay the month before.158 The newest offer came nearly a year
after Johnson & Johnson said it would buy Guidant for $25.4
billion. 59 Johnson & Johnson had cut that price by nearly $4 billion
after the series of product recalls. 1
60
Boston Scientific won the bidding war in late January 2006,
agreeing to pay a final price of $27 billion for Guidant. l6' That same
month, the FDA warned Boston Scientific that the government had
concerns about quality control in Boston Scientific's own factories
and its medical devices' safety. 162 FDA officials said the timing of
their warning was coincidental with the merger deal, but they also
suggested that the problems had festered, in part, because top
executives (who had spent nearly two months in the bidding war)
had failed to resolve the safety issues. 163 The FDA did not, however,
order product recalls, and placed no restrictions on the company's
ability to sell its devices.'
64
V. CONCLUSION
The marketplace initially seemed to penalize Guidant's belated
release of data until Boston Scientific opened up a bidding war.
Both the Republican-controlled Congress and health-care providers
have heated up their rhetoric in limiting people's ability to go to
court as a cure-all to rising medical costs. Also, while Congress has
passed or is considering tort reform, lawmakers are not examining
whether corporate trade secrets should be curbed so that data can be
released on heart products' failure rates, or if regulatory agencies are
protecting the public's health.
158. Ken Kusmer, Guidant Draws $25B Bid from Rival: Boston Scientific
tops Johnson & Johnson's offer by $3B, N. COUNTY TIMEs, Dec. 6, 2005, at
D1 available at http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2005/12/06/business/news/
12505190745.prt.
159. See id.
160. See id. (stating that Guidant and Johnson & Johnson's original deal
stalled after a series of product recalls and regulatory investigations).
161. Gardiner Harris & Barnaby J. Feder, FDA Warns Device Maker Over
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Zina Lewis and other patients who have vital information
gleaned from painful, personal experience have gone missing from
the debate. The absence of their voices may exact a heavy price
because heart disease is the nation's number one killer.165 Statistics
show that sometime during our lifetimes we, or our loved ones, could
become dependent on a heart device. 1
66
165. AM. HEART Ass'N, HEART DISEASE AND STROKES STATISTIcs-2006
UPDATE 7 (2006), available at http://www.americanheart.org/downloadable/
heart/l 136308648540Statupdate2006.pdf (reporting that in 2003 cardio-
vascular disease accounts for every 2.7 deaths in the United States and claims
nearly one life every 35 seconds).
166. See id. at 6-7.
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